Source: governance/security/archive/2026-04-remediation/REMEDIATION_REPORT.md — branch adpa-project-charter, repository mdresch/adpa.

Security Remediation Report - April 2026

1. Executive Summary

This report documents the remediation of critical security vulnerabilities identified in the ADPA framework during the April 2026 security audit. The focus was on Broken Access Control (BAC) and Remote Code Execution (RCE).

2. Vulnerabilities Addressed

2.1 Broken Access Control (BAC)

• Vector: Unauthorized cross-user resource access via direct ID lookups.
• Affected Modules: Playbooks, Issues, Risks.
• Remediation:
  • Implemented mandatory userId context in service-layer methods.
  • Hardened SQL queries to enforce ownership (created_by = $userId).
  • Updated controllers to propagate session-based identity.
• Verification: Verified via dedicated regression suite demonstrating failed unauthorized access (404/Null).

2.2 Remote Code Execution (RCE)

• Vector: Code injection via new Function() and with(context) in variable resolution strategies.
• Affected Modules: ConditionalLogic, ComputedValue, DefaultValue strategies.
• Remediation:
  • Replaced unsafe dynamic execution with the expr-eval secure parser.
  • Integrated expr-eval as a core server dependency.
• Verification: Verified via injection-string tests; malicious JS is now rejected or safely parsed as invalid syntax.

3. Reference Artifacts Archived

The following "hardened reference" files have been moved to this archive:

• playbookManagement-service-fixed.ts
• escalationGuidance-service-fixed.ts
• postResolutionAnalytics-service-fixed.ts

4. Maintenance & Safety

A permanent security regression suite has been initialized at server/src/__tests__/security/. All future resource modules MUST implement ownership enforcement following the "Gold Standard" established in playbookService.ts.

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Status: ✅ FULLY REMEDIATED Date: 2026-04-12 Authored By: Gemini CLI (Security Remediation Task)